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ABSTRACT
Research in blockchain systems has mainly focused on im-
proving security and bridging the performance gaps between
blockchains and databases. Despite many promising results,
we observe a worrying trend that the blockchain landscape is
fragmented in which many systems exist in silos. Apart from
a handful of general-purpose blockchains, such as Ethereum
or Hyperledger Fabric, there are hundreds of others designed
for specific applications and typically do not talk to each
other.
In this paper, we describe our vision of interoperable
blockchains. We argue that supporting interaction among
different blockchains requires overcoming challenges that go
beyond data standardization. The underlying problem is
to allow smart contracts running in different blockchains to
communicate. We discuss three open problems: access con-
trol, general cross-chain transactions, and cross-chain com-
munication. We describe partial solutions to some of these
problems in the literature. Finally, we propose a novel de-
sign to overcome these challenges.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A blockchain is a replicated, tamper-evident database de-
signed for hostile environments. It consists of a number of
nodes some of which may be malicious (or Byzantine), and
exposes an append-only log (or ledger) abstraction. The
ledger stores transactions that modify some global states.
In the canonical example, that is cryptocurrencies [38, 17],
the global states are user accounts and native currencies, and
the ledger contains transactions transferring currencies from
one account to another. Most blockchains support smart
contracts which let users define their own states and codes
that modify the states. Smart contracts are stored in the
ledger, which means they are replicated and kept consistent
by all the blockchain nodes.
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Figure 1: Example of a fragmented blockchain land-
scape. There is one blockchain per aspect of user
identity. But these systems do not talk to each
other.
Early blockchains have poor performance and scalabil-
ity [22] compared to distributed databases, and many smart
contracts contain security flaws [4, 31]. Much research ef-
fort has thus been spent on improving performance [19, 29]
and hardening smart contracts [44, 28], resulting in a new
generation of systems that achieve comparable performance
to some databases, and smart contracts that are much more
secure.
However, we observe that the blockchain ecosystem has
a long tail. On the one hand, there are a small number of
hugely popular, general-purpose blockchains. One example
is Ethereum [17], a public (or permissionless) blockchain in
which anyone can join. Another is Hyperledger Fabric [5], a
private (or permissioned) blockchain in which nodes’ iden-
tities are known to each other. On the other hand, there
are thousands of other blockchains designed for specific ap-
plications, most of which are only in early stages of devel-
opment. In particular, there are over 2500 blockchains for
cryptocurrencies1, 40 for healthcare2, 100 for identities man-
agement3, 25 for IoT4. More importantly, these blockchains
do not interoperate, i.e., they exist in silos. Figure 1 shows
an example of many blockchains storing different aspects of
a user’s identity (fragmentation across verticals), including
public key [10], financial records [17], medical records [7],
education certificates [1] and government records [2]. In-
1https://www.coinlore.com/all coins
2https://www.disruptordaily.com/
blockchain-market-map-healthcare/
3https://github.com/peacekeeper/blockchain-identity
4https://www.disruptordaily.com/
blockchain-market-map-iot/
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side each vertical, there are multiple isolated systems, com-
pounding further fragmentation. The user is overburdened
with managing numerous credentials to access different sys-
tems. Furthermore, the user is responsible for keeping data
between different systems consistent, for example, to update
his financial records when a new government record is issued
that certifies his tax exemptions.
Like in a database, data fragmentation is a major source of
inefficiency because it incurs management overheads. A typ-
ical database defragmentation algorithm would move data
around so that they are in the same place. This solution,
however, does not translate directly to blockchains, which
would involve adding another blockchain that aggregates all
data in one place, which is unwieldy and goes against the
very idea of decentralization. Instead, we argue that a prac-
tical direction is to make existing blockchains interopera-
ble. Interoperability entails more than standardizing mes-
sage format across different blockchains. It requires care-
fully designed protocols allowing one blockchain to access
data of another. Blockchain interoperability has received
little attention from the research community. Interledger [6]
and Cosmo network [3] are the only two notable examples
that aim at connecting blockchains.5 The former focuses on
connecting payment networks, whereas the latter focuses on
low-level message exchanges.
In this vision paper, we go deeper than connecting
blockchains, and seek designs that allow smart contracts
in one blockchain to access data of other smart contracts
in another blockchain. To this end, we identify three chal-
lenges. The first is to support secure, fine-grained access
control for smart contracts. Although any access policy can
arguably be implemented and enforced inside a stand-alone
smart contract, we note that good security practice requires
decoupling control policy and enforcement from actual data
access. The second challenge is to support general cross-
chain transactions which are different to atomic swaps [25,
20] and cross-chain deals [26]. This difference is similar
to that between general and one-shot transactions in dis-
tributed databases [18, 42]. The final challenge is to enable
communication between smart contracts, which is currently
not possible for contracts in different blockchains [8, 46].
We propose to overcome the first challenge by decoupling
access control from user smart contracts. We present a
framework consisting of a high-level language for specify-
ing fine-grained policies, and a runtime environment with
access to historical states. For the second challenge, we de-
sign a protocol that supports a transaction model similar to
Sinfonia’s mini-transaction [15] model which captures condi-
tional cross-chain swaps. For the third challenge, we propose
a publish/subscribe framework that let smart contracts send
and receive messages to and from the outside world.
In summary, our paper makes the following contributions:
• We highlight the problem of blockchain fragmentation,
and propose to mitigate it by making blockchains in-
teroperable.
• We discuss three challenges in designing interoperable
blockchains: access control, general transactions, and
cross-chain communication.
• We present high-level solutions to these challenges.
5However, there are no complete implementations of these
proposals.
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Figure 2: Example of cross-chain, general transac-
tions spanning three blockchains. The auction trans-
action involves writes which are dependent on reads.
Section 2 presents the problem in detail by elaborating
the three challenges. It explains why current systems fail to
adequately address these. Section 3 sketches our solutions.
We wrap up in Section 4 with concluding remarks.
2. CHALLENGES
We first motivate the problem of blockchain interoperabil-
ity through an example of an auction application. Next, we
discuss three crucial challenges that need to be addressed.
We describe how state-of-the-art systems only provide par-
tial building blocks for addressing these challenges.
2.1 Motivating Example
Alice owns a coveted football ticket stored on a ticket
blockchain (many permissioned blockchains are designed for
asset management, and therefore can be used to implement
such ticket application). Bob and Carol are avid football
fans and both want to buy the ticket. They are users of
the ticket blockchain, and each of them owns currencies at
other coin blockchains (for example Ethereum or XRP [12]).
Alice wants to start an auction on her ticket, to which Bob
and Carol submit their bids. The ticket blockchain does not
support bid submissions, thus Bob and Carol have to declare
their bids in their own blockchains. This auction is imple-
mented as smart contracts running on the three blockchains
realizing a distributed workflow [33].
Figure 2 shows the contracts’ logics and how they interact.
In particular, Alice uses an Auctioneer contract that escrows
the ticket when the auction starts. Bob and Carol specify
their bids to a Bidder contract that escrows the amount of
currencies submitted. Before they can submit bids, the Auc-
tioneer contract must start the auction at the Bidder con-
tract. When Alice decides to end the auction, the Auction-
eer contract reads submissions from the Bidder contracts on
the other two blockchains. It then computes the highest bid,
taking into account prevailing exchange rates among differ-
ent currencies. Finally, it atomically transfers ownership of
the ticket to the highest bidder, deducts the bid amount in
corresponding blockchain, and releases the other for refund.
There are three implications in enhancing existing
blockchains to support the interaction above. First, the Bid-
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der contract must execute read queries from another con-
tract. This warrants an access control mechanism which
allows Bidder to specify and enforce policies on who can
access which piece of data. Second, the conclude transac-
tion in Auctioneer is a general, interactive transaction that
involves cross-chain reads and cross-chain writes that are
dependent of the read values. Unlike one-shot transactions
or atomic cross-chain swaps, this type of transactions incurs
more than two network round-trips to first execute and then
commit the transaction. Third, both Auctioneer and Bidder
must be able to send and receive messages from each other.
For instance, Auctioneer must be able to send a read request
and listen for the response value from Bidder. However, this
is beyond the capability of current smart contracts.
2.2 Access Control
One may question the need for access control, since one
important property of blockchain is transparency which
means the blockchain nodes see all the data. We note that
for permissionless blockchains, only primitive forms of access
control (all-or-nothing access based on possession of private
keys) is meaningful. However, for a permissioned blockchain
there is a trust boundary between nodes inside and outside
of the system. Therefore, access control is needed to deter-
mine blockchain membership. Furthermore, the nodes may
wish to protect privacy of their data, therefore access from
outside the system (be it from a user or a smart contract),
especially write access, must be restricted. For example, a
blockchain for financial transactions between major banks
may only grant limited read access to auditors [39].
Existing permissioned blockchains have built-in support
for coarse-grained access policy. For instance, Hyperledger
Fabric provides a membership service that uses access con-
trol list (ACL) to determine who can read or write to the
ledger and the event streams. Fine-grained policies, which
give user more control over the data, are not supported.
Examples of such policies include the following:
• Data-dependent policies: only give access when some
predicates over the current data are true. In the auc-
tion example, the user can submit at most one bid (or
write) to the Bidder contract only when the auction is
still ongoing.
• Time-dependent policies: access is restricted by time.
In the context of blockchains, a time duration may be
represented as a range of blocks. In our example, the
writing period for the Bidder contract can be set to
expire after a certain number of blocks.
• Provenance-dependent policies: only give access when
some predicates over the data history (or provenance)
are true. In our example, the Bidder contract may only
allow the Auctioneer contract to start an auction if the
latter has not started more than a certain number of
auctions in the last b blocks. Another policy may be
to suspend a certain Auctioneer contract from starting
an auction if it has accepted a bid from a corrupt user.
Aˆa˘
• Aggregate policies: only give access to summaries of the
data. In the auction example, the Auctioneer contract
may grant read access to the total values of all winning
bids over a certain period to an auditor. Similarly, the
Bidder contract may grant access to statistics of user
bids to an external data analyst. Further constraints
such as the exposed statistics being differentially pri-
vate may also be imposed.
Aˆa˘ The first challenge is how to add support for these poli-
cies, particularly in a set-up where the information is dis-
persed across different blockchains. We note that they may
all be implemented explicitly inside the smart contract if all
the necessary information is self-contained in a blockchain,
but even that has two major limitations. The first limitation
is related to performance. In particular, in most blockchains
the contract can only access the latest data. Thus, to sup-
port provenance-dependent policies the contract will need to
explicitly keep track of historical data, for example, the Ver-
sionKVStore contract in [22]. This introduces redundancy
and unnecessary performance overhead because historical
data is already stored in the blockchain. The second lim-
itation is related to software engineering. More specifically,
smart contract development is an error-prone process often
carried out by non-security experts, therefore the risk of im-
plementing incorrect policies is high. Furthermore, many
contracts share similar policies, and implementing them in
every contract implies duplication of effort. These problems
are amplified when data from across multiple blockchains
are involved, due to concerns of correctness and consistency.
Another related challenge is the efficiency of enforcement.
For example, aggregate and differentially private policies re-
quire non-trivial computation to answer queries. Although
smart contract execution is not the performance bottleneck,
long execution time may break the incentive mechanisms
which are important for security [32].
In summary, the principal challenges for access control
are: support for fine-grained policies, ease of development,
and enforcement efficiency.
2.3 Cross-Chain Transactions
Transaction is an important abstraction in modern dis-
tributed databases [23, 43]. Blockchains assume a much
stronger failure model, namely Byzantine model, than the
crash failure model in databases. Consequently, supporting
transactions in blockchains is more challenging. We consider
only cross-chain transactions, instead of the normal, intra-
chain transactions which are executed serially by all nodes
in the blockchain and therefore satisfying all of the ACID
properties.
Read-only transactions, often considered the simplest
type of transaction, must ensure that responses from the
blockchain are correct and fresh. In our example, the Auc-
tioneer issues a read query to the Bidder and waits for the
response. It needs to verify that the response has not been
tampered with, and that it is fresh (not a replayed mes-
sage). Freshness can be achieved by including a nonce in
the request, and verifying it in the signatures of at least
f + 1 blockchain nodes.6 For query correctness, we note
that blockchain nodes can execute read queries directly on
top of the storage, or through the smart contract. The for-
mer is applicable only when the values are mapped directly
to the ledger data structure, for example block information
or key-value tuples. In this case, each node reads the values
directly from the storage, then includes integrity proofs as
part of the response. However, complex smart contracts do
6f is the fault-tolerance threshold, usually expressed in
terms of the number of Byzantine nodes.
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not map their data directly to the ledger data structure. For
example, bid tuples (user, auction_id, bid) are stored in
a list or a set as opposed to as key-value tuples. Therefore, in
general case, read queries must be executed through smart
contracts, and the responses are signed by correct blockchain
nodes, which ensures correctness and authenticity. However,
the cost is significant because every query must go through
consensus. Reducing this cost is a major challenge.
Concurrency arises due to cross-chain transactions. In our
example, when the Auctioneer contract wants to conclude an
auction, it sends a read request to Bidder and waits for the
response. The Bidder contract executes the read query as a
transaction, but it does not understand that the read is part
of another, larger transaction from another blockchain. Be-
fore Auctioneer finishes its transaction, the Bidder contract
accepts another bid that is the highest. Without coordi-
nation, the Auctioneer transaction is unaware of this new
bid and its execution becomes invalid. In other words, the
transaction is not serializable. State-of-the-art blockchain
systems use lock based concurrency control to achieve seri-
alizability [19]. Specifically, smart contracts maintain one
lock per key-value tuple, and a transaction must acquire all
locks before it can commit. This strategy is safe, but as
demonstrated in [19], it results in high abort rate and sig-
nificantly reduced throughput.
Atomicity in the context of cross-chain transactions, like
in traditional databases, means that the transaction exe-
cutes to completion or not at all. In our example, the trans-
action that concludes auction must be atomic; otherwise it
could so happen that the highest bidder gets the ticket with-
out paying, or users who submitted lower bids fail to get
their refunds. The classic solution to atomicity is the two
phase commit (2PC) protocol, which is run by a transaction
coordinator. Implementing 2PC in blockchain is more chal-
lenging than in databases, because the coordinator is not
trusted. Both [19, 26] propose to run 2PC in a Byzantine
fault-tolerant network, i.e. in another blockchain.
State-of-the-art atomic cross-chain transactions,
namely [19, 26, 25], consider only one-shot transac-
tions [42]. Like in databases, this type of transaction does
not require communication between the blockchains during
both the execution and commit phase. As a result, the
transaction can be executed and committed in two network
round trips from the coordinator to the blockchains. Atomic
swaps and cross-chain deals [26] involve only write opera-
tions to the blockchain, therefore they are both one-shot.
In particular, cross-chain deals are modeled as n × n write
matrix for n users.
We argue that support for more general transactions is
needed. In our example, the conclude transaction at the
Auctioneer contract is not one-shot, because the write oper-
ations are dependent on the read values. This type of inter-
active transactions, like in databases, is expensive because
they require multiple network round trips to execute and
commit. Therefore, the challenge is to design an efficient
protocol for cross-chain transactions that are more general
than one-shot. We note that [26] mentioned support for con-
ditional swaps, which are similar to our example above, but
did not describe how it works.
In summary, the challenges in supporting cross-chain
transaction are how to provide efficient read transactions,
how to extract more concurrency, and how to reduce com-
munication for general transactions. They are the same chal-
lenges the database community wrestles with [23, 37, 36].
2.4 Communication
One major limitation of current smart contracts is that
they do not talk to the outside world. They can only access
resources on the blockchain such as the ledger and execu-
tion engine. The contract treats local states and user in-
puts as ground truth, and makes no assumption about data
from other sources. Some external services, such as Ora-
clize [8], provide authentic data feeds, such that messages
signed by them are accepted by the contract. Towncrier [46]
and PDFS [24] also address authenticity problem, but with-
out relying on trusted parties. The former leverages trusted
hardware [14], while the latter depends on users to audit
transparent logs. For real-world data, we believe authen-
ticity (as opposed to trustworthiness) is the best that can
be achieved. On the other hand, data that comes from an-
other blockchain can be considered trustworthy, under the
assumption that the blockchain as a whole is trusted.
Our goal is to design an efficient communication in-
frastructure for sending and receiving messages between
blockchains. Interledger protocol (ILP) [6] and Cosmos’
inter-blockchain communication (IBC) [3] are two recent
proposals for connecting blockchains. ILP is specific to cryp-
tocurrencies, and its design is optimized for sending pay-
ments from one blockchain to another. It is based heavily
on payment channels [35], and therefore does not general-
ize to other blockchain applications. IBC proposes a more
generic communication protocol which handles data trans-
port, authentication and connection reliability. Beside being
in early stage of development, IBC requires intrusive changes
to the blockchain stack, as it needs to be deeply integrated
with the state-machine component of the blockchain node.
Another limitation of IBC is that it is a networking-layer
protocol, therefore it leaves much complexity to the applica-
tion layer (i.e., the smart contracts). For example, IBC only
relays messages and does not distinguish between ones car-
rying data versus carrying proof. Finally, IBC is connection-
oriented, which means both communication endpoints have
to maintain connection states. This connection model is
suitable when the endpoints are responsive, for example in
a client-server model, and when the network is often reli-
able. However, it is not suitable for blockchains, because
the network is hostile (it may have Byzantine nodes) and
transaction latency is high.
In summary, the challenge is to design a stateless commu-
nication protocol that ensures timely and reliable delivery
of messages. The protocol needs to work at the applica-
tion layer, which understands and contains optimizations
for common requirements of cross-chain communication. Fi-
nally, the protocol needs to be resilient to network failures.
3. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Figure 3 shows our proposed architecture for interoperable
blockchains. The current blockchain stack, consisting of a
storage, consensus and smart contract components [22], re-
mains unchanged. We add new components that implement
support for access control, transactions, and communica-
tion. This architecture avoids designing a new blockchain
from scratch, and allows for incremental adoption. In the
following, we sketch our high-level design for each of the new
components. We describe how we expect to overcome the
challenges discussed in the previous section. We stress that
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Figure 3: The architecture for interoperable
blockchains, with newly added components for
transaction, access control and communication. The
old software stack remains unchanged.
our approach builds on existing solutions, and it is only to
start the discussion. More research is needed to find better
solutions and to validate them.
3.1 Access Control
We decouple access control from user smart contracts and
implement it as a system contract. As shown in Figure 4[a],
the user contracts can invoke the access control mechanism
by calling another contract within the same blockchain. We
implement it as a contract as opposed to a system library
because it allows users to update policies without changing
the software at all the nodes. This design solves the ease-of-
development challenge.
To support fine-grained policies, we propose to design a
policy language that is expressive and easy to use. This lan-
guage is declarative and can be based on either Google Fire-
store [13] or Datalog [30]. The access control contract con-
tains the language interpreter to parse and then enforce the
policy. To support access to historical data during enforce-
ment, we propose to use LineageChain [41], a state-of-the
blockchain storage providing rich data access to smart con-
tracts. LineageChain and its underlying engine called Fork-
base [45] have been evaluated on Hyperledger Fabric. More
work is needed to port them to Ethereum runtime. Finally,
to improve enforcement efficiency, we propose to add concur-
rency to the smart contract execution engine [21]. The fact
that current blockchains execute transactions sequentially
means there is plenty of room for improvement.
3.2 Cross-Chain Transactions
Figure 4[b] shows the key components for transactions im-
plemented as a system library which a smart contract can
invoke. To improve efficiency for read-only transactions, it
is necessary to avoid going through consensus. This means
the storage must be able to produce integrity proofs for the
read values. We propose to enhance blockchain storage with
more expressive, high-level data structures that are verifi-
able and can be directly used by the smart contract. Ex-
amples include map and list structure. Trillian [9] provides
strong security properties for map structures. Forkbase [45]
provides weaker guarantees for both map and list structure.
Our proposed solution is based on Forkbase.
To extract more concurrency from cross-chain transac-
tions, we propose to add support for optimistic concurrency
control (lock-based mechanisms are still provided, because
Storage
Consensus
Smart contract
Communication
1
events
PubSub
2
send message
3
receive message
Storage
Consensus
Smart contract
AC Contract
Policy interprerter
Enhanced runtime
Enhanced storage
check
access
update
policy
Storage
Consensus
Smart contract
Transaction
Locks
2PC
OCC
MiniTransaction
use
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 4: Main components of access control, trans-
actions and communication.
they work well under high contention). The OCC proto-
col works the same way as in databases: it keeps track of
read/write sets and aborts when there are newer versions.
We directly use the version tracking feature provided by the
storage [45] to implement this.
Finally, to reduce transaction communications, we pro-
pose to implement the mini-transaction abstraction [15]
which captures conditional data swaps. A mini-transaction
comprises a compare, a read, and a write phase with known
read and write sets. Although it does not capture all general,
interactive transactions, its execution and commit phase can
be optimized to finish in two network round trips. For other
unsupported types of transactions, we provide general locks
and 2PC implementation. During execution, all locks are
acquired. During commit, the Byzantine-tolerant 2PC is
run by one of the blockchains.
3.3 Communication
Figure 4[c] shows our communication infrastructure which
is stateless, efficient, and works at the application level. It
is based on publish-subscribe system. A communication li-
brary runs at every blockchain node and subscribes to the
event streams produced by the blockchain stack. It then
publishes the events to the pub-sub system, which deliv-
ers them to the destination blockchain. A cross-chain event
contains names of the source, destination blockchain, and
identifier of both the source and destination contract.
The communication library automatically adds unique
nonces to every sent event to guarantee freshness. We also
propose running a dedicated gateway node to which all
nodes forward their events. This gateway then waits and
batches f + 1 signatures of the same event before publish-
ing them to the pub-sub system, which significantly reduces
network cost.
We note that the pub-sub system is not a centralized
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component. One way to realize this system is to have the
communication blockchains running their own P2P pub-sub
system. However, a more practical approach is to use a
third-party service such as Amazon SNS. This service does
not have to be trusted for security, because messages be-
tween blockchains are cryptographically signed. Further-
more, multiple services from different providers can be used
at the same time, without coordination among them, to in-
crease quality of service and avoid denial of service attacks
(such as dropping of messages).
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have discussed related work extensively in the previous
sections. Here, we highlight three orthogonal research direc-
tions that may benefit from our work. First, off-chain scaling
systems such as Plasma [40] and sidechains [16] use multiple
blockchains to improve overall throughput. Our work can
be applied to make communication between the sub-chains
more efficient and richer. Second, there is a trend towards
decentralized systems, of which blockchain is only one ex-
ample. Other examples include identity management [34],
personal storage [11], and social network [27]. These sys-
tems exist in silos, and our work can be applied to build
novel applications on top of them. Finally, our approach
can help realize general purpose distributed workflows [33].
We presented our vision of making blockchains interop-
erable, as a solution to the current fragmented blockchain
ecosystem. We discussed three challenges in realizing our
vision: fine-grained access control, cross-chain transactions,
and cross-chain communication. Finally, we proposed solu-
tions to address these challenges, which serves as starting
points for future research.
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